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Available online xxxxCan foreign aid promote economic freedom? The existing literature does not provide a conclu-
sive answer. Using a panel of 108 countries from 1971 to 2010, we provide insight to this dis-
cussion by examining aid's impact on economic freedom conditional on the quality of political
institutions. We ﬁnd some evidence suggesting that aid can improve economic freedom when
given to democracies, but it may decrease it in autocracies. Also, aid given to entrenched re-
gimes may reduce economic freedom. We illustrate that the results are sensitive to model se-
lection, choice of controls, time period sample, and measurement of aid. Our results have
important policy implications. Most countries that ‘need’ aid do not have healthy political insti-
tutions. As such, aid is less likely to have a positive impact on economic freedom, partially
explaining the contradictory ﬁndings in the literature. This also highlights the difﬁculty of ﬁnd-
ing a top-down solution to institutional improvements.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Political institutions1. Introduction
Economic institutions consistent with the principles of economic freedom are linked to growth, human development and over-
all human ﬂourishing (see Hall and Lawson, 2014, for a review). However, a substantial portion of the world remains in extreme
poverty and lacks basic human rights. Despite a considerable amount of literature devoted to institutions and development, un-
derstanding how to establish such institutions and policies remains a mystery for most of the developing world. Gaining insight
into this ‘how’ has a potentially high payoff as economic institutional change can promote economic and human development.
This paper examines if foreign aid can serve as a tool to positively inﬂuence a recipient country's economic institutions. Dreher
and Gehring (2012) summarize that aid can inﬂuence economic freedom through three main channels: direct monetary transfer,
conditionality, and knowledge transfer. We build from previous works to contend that the magnitude of these channels is condi-
tional on the existence of democratic checks as democracies provide monitoring to minimize misappropriation of aid funds. Thus,
we explore how the impact of aid varies, if at all, when interacted with the quality and durability of political institutions.
With higher aid inﬂows, recipient nations beneﬁt not only from ﬁnancial resources but also from knowledge, expertise and
technical assistance provided by the donor staff. This knowledge may include promoting market-oriented economic reforms.
This was, after all, the main idea behind the Washington Consensus, which established foreign aid guiding principles including
free trade, sound money, and property rights. Moreover, given the skepticism attached to aid's effectiveness, donors often choose
to allocate aid conditional on improving the economic policy environment. In addition, aid can compensate politically powerfuldia.williamson@msstate.edu (C.R. Williamson).
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reform. Thus, aid may positively inﬂuence economic transformation toward economic freedom (Heckelman and Knack, 2008).
Yet, on the other hand, by providing an alternate source of revenue, aid can disincentivize governments to create efﬁcient eco-
nomic institutions (Devarajan et al., 2001, chapter 1). Since aid dollars typically go to the recipient government, political leaders
may take up inefﬁcient investment projects and subsidize state-owned enterprises (Heckelman and Knack, 2008). In addition, as
pointed out by Collier (1997), foreign aid can have unintended consequences such as increased tax revenues and greater trade
taxes based on donor advice. Aid is also linked to increases in rent seeking and centralization of power, leading to a deterioration
of institutional quality (Djankov et al., 2008).
Thus, theoretically, aid's impact on economic institutions is ambiguous. Empirical studies also ﬁnd conﬂicting evidence. Several
studies conclude that aid does not increase economic freedom and may decrease it (for example, Knack, 2001; Young and
Sheehan, 2014). Heckelman and Knack (2008) ﬁnd that aid decreases freedom in the 1980s, but aid does not signiﬁcantly impact
economic freedom in the 1990s. In a follow-up study, Heckelman and Knack (2009) conclude that aid has no signiﬁcant effect on
economic institutions. Dreher and Rupprecht (2007) and Knedlik and Kronthaler (2007) focus on changes in economic freedom
and ﬁnd that IMF involvement reduces economic freedom. However, Bearce and Tirone (2010) show that aid has no effect on
economic freedom before the 1990s but has a positive effect after the Cold War. Boockmann and Dreher (2003) document that
the number of World Bank projects increases economic freedom.1
Overall, the conclusions from these studies are ambiguous. This research dilemma is similar to the literature on aid and polit-
ical institutions (for example, Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Morrison, 2007,
2009). Askarov and Doucouliagos (2015) ﬁnd that aid positively affects democratization in transition countries. They also ﬁnd
that total aid has no effect on governance, while US aid decreases some dimensions of governance. Others highlight that aid ef-
fectiveness is conditional on the recipients' political institutions. As pointed out by Kono and Montinola (2009); Wright (2009),
and Dutta et al. (2013), the ability of foreign aid to inﬂuence a country's level of democracy is conditional on the existing political
institutional infrastructure including the level of democracy and age of the regime.
Our paper attempts to resolve the ambiguity in the economic freedom-aid literature by following the advancements in the po-
litical freedom-aid literature making aid's effectiveness conditional on the quality of political institutions. Therefore, we propose
that aid's impact on economic freedom is also conditional on political institutional factors. Democratically constrained govern-
ments will be more likely to utilize aid in a manner that promotes economic freedom. Democratic checks minimize the ability
for recipient governments to misappropriate aid funds and increase the likelihood that conditions are met. As a result, aid may
be channeled to beneﬁcial uses including positive economic reforms.
Several studies ﬁnd that mature democracies function more effectively relative to nascent democracies. Duch (2001) shows
that in nascent democracies voters may fail to punish or reward governments as needed. Additionally, Mohtadi and Roe (2003)
ﬁnd that young democracies suffer from inadequately developed checks on government. As a result, mature democratic institu-
tions may provide continuity and stability. On the contrary, regime entrenchment can stiﬂe political competition undermining in-
stitutional quality (see, Kono and Montinola, 2009). Thus, we also test aid's effectiveness with regard to age of the regime, or
political durability.
To test these conjectures, we measure economic institutions with the Fraser Institute's economic freedom index (Gwartney
et al., 2015). We introduce two interaction terms based on the quality and durability of political institutions: aid*democracy
and aid*durability. Democracy is measured with polity2 and durability is the number of years since a regime change2 (Marshall
et al., 2014). The interactive approach, as opposed to split samples, is commonly used when conditioning foreign aid on political
institutions (Kono and Montinola, 2009; Wright, 2009; Dutta et al., 2013).
As summarized above, previous ﬁndings are often inconclusive and contradictory. Dreher and Gehring (2012) highlight that in
order to draw any conclusions from this body of work a common framework should be adopted. This includes how to address
endogeneity concerns. Thus, part of our contribution is to present our results with a variety of estimators. We employ ﬁve
model estimators including ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variable (IV) estimation, two-way ﬁxed effects, IV ﬁxed ef-
fects, and System GMM estimation. To externally instrument for aid, we utilize two common measures of political afﬁnity, voting
afﬁnity with major foreign aid donors in the United Nations General Assembly and temporary membership on the United Nations
Security Council. We use a panel of 108 developing countries from 1971 to 2010, with 5-year averages, creating 8 time periods.
Our results ﬁnd some evidence that aid's impact on economic freedom depends on the recipient nations' quality and durability
of political institutions. In democratic countries, aid may improve economic freedom, but it may decrease it in autocracies. In ad-
dition, aid given to durable political regimes may degrade economic institutions. These results are sensitive to model selection,
choice of controls, time period sample, and measurement of aid.1 Others relate aid to speciﬁc aspects of economic freedom. Remmer (2004) ﬁnds that bilateral aid increases government spending. Coviello and Islam (2006) and Ear
(2007) ﬁnd that ODA reduces property rights and increases regulations, but Kilby (2005) shows that aid decreases regulations. Cali and te Velde (2011) ﬁnd that aid
speciﬁc to trade reduces trading costs. Dreher (2005) ﬁnds a connection between IMF projects and lower inﬂation rates. Mukherjee and Singer (2010) report a positive
effect of IMF loans on capital account liberalization,while Biglaiser and DeRouen (2011) ﬁnd that participation in an IMF program increases trade and promotes capital-
market reforms.
2 Regime refers to a country's political system. A regime change is deﬁned as either a three point change in the polity score during the past three years or less or the
end of a transition period. This variable is designed to capture political stability.
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support for foreign aid's potential positive impact on economic freedom in democracies, but they also suggest that aid given to
autocracies decreases economic freedom. When using IV estimations, our results also suggest that aid decreases economic free-
dom in autocracies, but in most IV regressions aid has no signiﬁcant association with economic freedom in democracies. If IV pro-
vides a better mechanism for addressing endogeneity, our results suggest that aid may not positively inﬂuence economic freedom
and could reduce it. However, given the political nature of our instruments, we note that the IV results could understate aid's
effectiveness.
Collectively, our results suggest that aid responds differently depending on the political institutional context, and these results
depend on the identiﬁcation strategy. Thus, our ﬁndings support the lack of robustness across previous studies and highlight the
difﬁculty in drawing strong policy conclusions.2. Data description and empirical methodology
2.1. Data description
To measure economic institutions, we use an index of economic freedom collected from Gwartney et al. (2015). This index is
our primary dependent variable. The economic freedom (EF) index ranges from 0 to 10 with a higher score reﬂecting greater eco-
nomic freedom. The index is grouped into ﬁve broad components—size of government, monetary policy and price stability, legal
structure and security of private property, freedom to trade without regulations, and regulation of credit, labor and business. We
use the overall index for all main speciﬁcations but analyze the ﬁve sub-indices for robustness. As reported in Table 1, the mean
for economic freedom is 6.6 with a standard deviation of 1.1. The lowest score is 3.2 with a maximum of 9.2.
Foreign aid is the main independent variable of interest. We use a broad measure of foreign aid, net ofﬁcial development as-
sistance (ODA) as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) (WDI, 2015). ODA includes concessional loans and grants intended
to improve welfare and economic development in recipient countries. ODA includes bilateral and multilateral aid collected by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Bilateral aid is reported to OECD from both DAC and non-DAC
members. For any given year, the speciﬁc donors included will vary as data is self-reported from each agency.4
We lag aid by one ﬁve-year period as it can take several years for aid to be effective (Headey, 2008; Clemens et al., 2012). The
mean of aid is 7.2 with a large standard deviation of 9.3. Aid ranges from −0.1 (Thailand in 2010) to 59.6 (Mozambique in 1995)
indicating that some countries in our sample are repaying previous debts, while others receive large portions of aid. As robustness,
we use net disbursed ofﬁcial development assistance received by a country divided by population.
Our main conjecture is that aid's impact on economic freedom is conditional on political institutions. This includes the quality
and age of the regime. We ﬁrst employ a popular measure of the quality of political institutions, the polity2 variable (Democ)
from Polity IV database (Marshall et al., 2014). The variable ranges from −10 to +10 with −10 representing the strongest au-
tocracy and +10 the strongest democracy. The mean is 2.7 with a standard deviation of 6.7. We also include a measure of polit-
ical stability (Durable). This variable calculates the number of years since the most recent regime change, where regime refers to a
country's political system and a regime change represents a three point change in the polity score in the past three years or less.
Durable ranges from 0 to 194 with a mean of 23.5 and a standard deviation of 29.8. It is also collected from Polity IV (Marshall
et al., 2014).
When choosing control variables, we follow the existing literature and employ variables that capture time varying heteroge-
neity (for example, Heckelman and Knack, 2008; Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2011). Our benchmark control
variables include GDP per capita, GDP growth, population growth, and male labor force participation rate. All controls are collect-
ed from WDI (2015).
As suggested by Boockmann and Dreher (2003) economic freedom should be enhanced in the presence of growth and pros-
perity. As a country gets richer, it might demand more economic freedom. Therefore, we include income measured as log of gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita (2005 constant U.S. dollars) and the annual economic growth rate (Dreher and Rupprecht,
2007; Knedlik and Kronthaler, 2007; Heckelman and Knack, 2008; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2011). Likewise, a growing population
is more likely to demand economic freedom. Thus, we control for population growth (Young and Sheehan, 2014). In addition, as3 These results are similar to recent ﬁndings on aid and growth as the literature lacks an accepted identiﬁcation strategy. There is some evidence suggesting that aid
relates positively to economic growth; others do not ﬁnd any evidence of an association; and, ﬁnally, some conclude that aid in certain countries can be harmful. In
addition, the aid-policy-growth connection is also weak. For the most recent work, see Rajan and Subramanian (2008); Clemens et al. (2012); Dreher et al. (2014),
and Dreher and Langlotz (2015).
4 The following list includes all potential donors included in our measure of ODA. DAC members as of 2010 include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UnitedKingdom,United States. Non-DACmembers that report toOECD include Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia,
Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, Timor Leste, United Arab
Emirates. Multilateral institutions that report to OECD include Adaptation Fund, African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Arab Fund, Asian Development
Bank, AsDB Special Funds, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Caribbean Development Bank, Climate Investment Funds, Council of Europe Development
Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EU Institutions, Food and Agriculture Organization, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, Global
Environment Facility, Global Green Growth Institute, Global Fund International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association
Inter-American Development Bank, IDB Special Fund, IFAD, International Finance Corporation, IMF, Islamic Development Bank, Nordic Development Fund, OPEC Fund
for International Development, OSCE, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECE, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Peacebuilding Fund, UNRWA, WFP, World Health Organization.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Economic Freedom is the overall index of Economic Freedom Index from Fraser Institute ranging from 0 to 10with higher numbers representing greater economic free-
dom collected from Gwartney et al. (2015). Aidt − 1 is net disbursements of ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) received by a country as a fraction of gross domestic
national income (WDI, 2015), with t − 1 representing lagged by one period. Democt − 1 is Polity2 from the Polity IV database and the variable ranges from−10 to 10,
with 10 representing a strong democracy (Polity IV,Marshall et al., 2014). Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt − 1 is an interaction created fromAidt − 1multiplied byDemoct − 1.GDP per
capitat − 1 is log gross domestic product per capita, 2005 constant U.S. dollars. Pop. growtht − 1 is the annual population growth rate (%), GDP growtht − 1 is the annual
growth rate (%), LFPR (male)t − 1 is the percentage of male labor force participation, all collected fromWDI (2014).Durable is the number of years since themost recent
regime change (Polity IV, Marshall et al., 2014). Aidt – 1 ∗ Durablet − 1 is the interaction term of Aidt − 1 times Durablet − 1. Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt – 1 ∗ Durablet − 1 is an in-
teraction term of Aidt − 1 timesDemoct − 1 timesDurablet − 1. Arms imports pct − 1 is arms imports per capita, Tradet − 1 is the sumof imports plus exports of goods and
services as a share of gross domestic product, Resource rentt − 1 is total natural resources rents as a share of GDP, all collected fromWDI (2014).UNvotes with USt − 1,UN
votes with Francet − 1, UN votes with GBt − 1, UN votes with Italyt − 1, and UN votes with Japant − 1 is United Nations voting in line with the United States, France, Great
Britain, Italy, and Japan, respectively (Dreher and Sturm, 2012). UNSCt − 2 is a dummy variable representing temporary membership on the United Nations Security
Council, lagged two periods (Dreher et al., 2011).
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max
Economic freedom 492 6.6 1.1 3.2 9.2
Aidt − 1 437 7.2 9.3 −0.1 59.6
Democt − 1 562 2.7 6.7 −10.0 10.0
Aidt – 1 ∗ Democ t − 1 407 −1.4 66.7 −475.6 272.8
GDP per capita (log)t − 1 1198 8503 12,824 123 82,775
Pop. growtht − 1 620 1.6 1.4 −4.1 7.7
GDP growtht − 1 586 3.5 3.9 −20.6 30.8
LFPR (male)t − 1 616 80.5 6.5 59.5 95.2
Durablet − 1 566 23.5 29.8 0.0 194.0
Aidt − 1 ∗ Durablet − 1 411 92.5 208.5 −1.4 2358.1
Arms imports pct − 1 1115 22.3 59.4 0 1033.3
Tradet − 1 600 76.9 46.7 0.6 383.7
Resource rentt − 1 600 9.0 12.1 0.0 63.6
UN votes with USt − 1 1010 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.9
UN votes with Francet − 1 1010 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.9
UN votes with GBt − 1 1010 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.9
UN votes with Italyt − 1 1010 0.5 0.2 0.0 1.0
UN votes with Japant − 1 1010 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.9
UNSCt − 2 914 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0
4 N. Dutta, C.R. Williamson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxmore individuals are employed and contribute to economic production, they may prefer additional economic freedoms. Therefore,
we control for male labor force participation.
We further test our results to the inclusion of additional variables. These variables include arms imports per capita (Kilby,
2005), trade as a share of GDP (Coviello and Islam, 2006; Knedlik and Kronthaler, 2007), and resource rents as a share of GDP
(Knedlik and Kronthaler, 2007; Young and Sheehan, 2014). All variables are collected from WDI (2015). We lag all explanatory
variables by one period.2.2. Empirical methodology
Building on the previous literature, we ﬁrst check the direct impact of foreign aid on economic freedom. We then proceed to
test our main question – can aid's impact on economic freedom be enhanced by political institutions? We conjecture that aid's
impact is conditional on the recipients' quality and durability of political institutional framework.
The foremost challenge we face is endogeneity with respect to foreign aid (Clemens et al., 2012; Dreher et al., 2014; Dreher
and Langlotz, 2015). A country's level of economic freedom can be a determinant of aid inﬂows as donors often give aid to im-
prove recipients' institutional quality. Thus, aid is likely to be endogenous arising out of reverse causality. Furthermore,
endogeneity can also be present due to omitted variable bias. To help address identiﬁcation, we employ ﬁve estimators including
ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variable (IV) estimation, two-way ﬁxed effects, IV ﬁxed effects, and System GMM. We
treat aid and the interaction terms as endogenous, instrumenting with external instruments and generated instruments via mo-
ment conditions for the dynamic panel estimators. All variables are lagged by one period and each speciﬁcation includes period
dummies and the benchmark controls.
In order to ﬁnd valid external instruments for foreign aid, we turn to recent ﬁndings in the aid-growth literature (Dreher et al.,
2014; Dreher and Langlotz, 2015). A subset of studies employ instruments based on geopolitical importance of the recipient coun-
try. Dreher and Gehring (2012) suggests that ‘properly controlling for the potential endogeneity of aid to freedom provides an
important avenue for additional research...and political variables like temporary membership in the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b) or voting in line with donors in the United Nations General Assem-
bly (Carter and Stone, 2010) might also prove useful’ (237).
Therefore, we use both variables as instruments, voting alignment with major donors in the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) (Bjørnskov, 2013; Midtgaard et al., 2014; Creasey et al., 2015) and temporary membership in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) (Christensen et al., 2011; Breitwieser and Wick, 2016).Please cite this article as: Dutta, N.,Williamson, C.R., Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions, Europe-
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similar voting behavior with a major aid donor could warrant additional aid inﬂows to the recipient country. Previous works sup-
port this conjecture arguing that voting with major donors signals that the potential recipient country is like-minded. As a result,
that country is more likely to receive aid (Bjørnskov, 2013; Midtgaard et al., 2014; Creasey et al., 2015). Thus, we use the share of
key votes in the UNGA that are in line with the voting patterns of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, or France as instru-
ments for foreign aid.5 All variables are lagged one period and data are collected from Dreher and Sturm (2012).
Our second instrument is a dummy variable that represents temporary membership on the UNSC, lagged two periods (Dreher
et al., 2011). Prior literature shows that temporary members receive substantial additional aid dollars while serving on the UNSC
(Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b). This result is similar to UNGA voting behavior if temporary members
are viewed as aligning with potential aid donors.
Our instruments are arguably excludable; however, due to political favoritism these variables may inﬂuence aid effectiveness
(Kilby and Dreher, 2010). Aid allocated based on political partiality may lead to donors approving lower quality projects and re-
quiring fewer conditions in favor of economic reform. If so, aid may deteriorate the quality of institutions (Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith, 2010a, 2010b; Nooruddin and Vreeland, 2010; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2011; Dreher et al., 2014). Therefore, political biases
can reduce the effectiveness of aid decreasing the likelihood that aid will enhance economic freedom. As such, politically based
instruments generalize the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) to represent all aid, not just politically driven aid. If so, our es-
timates represent a lower bound and may understate the effects of overall aid. We believe this could at least partially explain why
our results using IV estimation is less positive than the ﬁndings using GMM estimation.
We instrument aid with UN voting in line with major donors and a UNSC membership dummy variable. When we include an
interaction term in our model, we create additional instruments by multiplying the interaction term times each instrument.6 Thus,
our speciﬁcations are always over-identiﬁed. First stage results from Tables 2 and 3 are reported in Appendix A1. The adjusted R-
squares are consistently above the 0.20 suggested threshold in all speciﬁcations. For the majority of speciﬁcations, the F-statistic is
above its suggested threshold of 10. However, it falls below 10 (F-statistic = 5 in Table 2 and F-statistic = 9 in Table 3) in the
two ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations. This possibly indicates that our instruments are weak. The Hansen J-statistics, reported at the bot-
tom of each table, suggest that over identiﬁcation restrictions for the instruments are met.
Finally, we employ System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. As pointed out by Murray (2006) and Baum
(2008), the ﬁnite-sample properties of IV estimates are problematic. Furthermore, as argued by Clemens et al. (2012), IV estima-
tors may not be an improvement over OLS estimators since our instruments could be weak. Persson and Tabellini (2006) note the
difﬁculty in ﬁnding efﬁcient, time varying instruments that are strictly exogenous. Thus, an alternative to IV estimation is GMM
estimators (see, Bergh and Nilsson, 2010, for example).
By generating instruments via moment conditions, GMM estimation takes into account endogeneity concerns. Treating aid and
the interaction terms as endogenous, we employ System GMM estimators using the levels of the equation to obtain a system of
two equations – one differenced and one in levels.7 We use System GMM over Difference GMM since the former exploits addi-
tional moment conditions (see, Mishra and Newhouse, 2009). In addition, System GMM avoids inconsistent estimators as these
instruments are not correlated with the error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). However, Bazzi and
Clemens (2013) argue that GMM estimators should be interpreted with caution since excludability is unlikely.
Thus, we use multiple estimation techniques in an attempt to not skew the ﬁndings since each model contains potential
biases. In addition, part of our contribution to the literature is presenting the results with a variety of estimators in order to pro-
vide comparable ﬁndings. By using OLS, ﬁxed effects, IV estimations, and System GMM, we provide insight into previous ﬁndings
as well as attempt to provide soundness to our results.
As mentioned above, we ﬁrst test aid's direct impact on economic freedom. Next, we test aid's impact conditional on political
institutions. To do so, we introduce two different interaction terms into the model. We prefer this methodology over splitting our
dataset into somewhat arbitrary sub-samples in order to more easily interpret the coefﬁcients. Therefore, we test the following
reduced form equation:5 Foll
nated a
6 Sev
Dreher
able. Al
the new
7 We
Pleas
an JoEFit ¼ α0 þ α1EFit−1 þ α2Aidit−1 þ α3Pol Inst:it−1 þ α4 Aid  Pol:Inst:ð Þit−1 þ Xit−1βþ γθt þ εitAll variables represent country i in period t. EFit stands for economic freedom and EFit−1 represents economic freedom in
period t−1. α1 captures the persistence of the dependent variable. Aidit−1 represents net ofﬁcial development assistance
inﬂows lagged one period. Pol.Inst.it-1 represents political institutions, either democracy or durable, lagged one period.
Aidit − 1 ∗ Pol.Inst.it − 1 denotes one of the two interaction terms, lagged one period: Aid times democracy Aidit − 1 ∗ Democ-
it − 1 and aid times durable Aidit − 1 ∗ Durableit − 1. Xit−1 represents the vector of control variables, lagged one period. θt is the
vector for period dummies and εit is the random error term. To provide interpretation, we calculate the marginal impact of
aid by δEFitδAidit ¼ α2 þ α4 Pol:Inst:it−1.owing Kilby (2009), key votes are United Nations votes that appear on the U.S. State Department's list, Voting Practices in the United Nations, which are desig-
s important votes to the United States.
eral recent and innovative papers provide support for the excludability of these instruments (see, Werker et al., 2009; Ahmed, 2013; Nunn and Qian, 2014;
and Langlotz, 2015). They create alternative identiﬁcation strategies using interactions between an excludable instrument and a potentially endogenous vari-
though we are multiplying the endogenous aid variable and a political institutions variable by the exogenous instrument (UN votes or UNSC membership),
ly constructed instruments for the interaction terms should remain excludable since they include the original excludable instruments.
use the STATA command xtdpdsyswith a two-step estimator for the Windmeijer correction.
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Table 2
Impact of aid on economic freedom.
Dependent variable is economic freedom (EF). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 0.706*** 0.718*** 0.240*** 0.204** 0.583***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04)
Aid t − 1 0.008 0.016 0.010 −0.033 −0.003
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.003)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.079 0.111 −0.511** −0.810** −0.034
(0.05) (0.08) (0.19) (0.25) (0.05)
Democt − 1 0.019** 0.019** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.020 −0.019 0.003 −0.047 −0.086***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.022 0.00001
(0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.002 −0.001 −0.022 −0.025 −0.022***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 2.412 1.241 9.954*** – 4.900***
(1.47) (1.08) (1.70) (0.82)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 303 294 303 290 304
Adj. R2 0.72 0.71 0.51 0.21 –
Number of countries 81 80 81 76 82
Number of instruments – 6 – 6 50
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.23 – 0.36 0.39
Auto-correlation p-value – – – – 0.20
r ¼ ni – – – – 1.64
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year averages creating 8 time periods. For example, time period 1 is averaged from 1971 to 1975, time period 2 is averaged from
1976 to 1980, and so on.8 All data are constructed in this manner except economic freedom. Economic freedom is only available
every 5 years from 1970 to 2000. Accordingly, the 1975 value of the economic freedom index is assigned to period 1, 1980 is
assigned to period 2, and so on through period 6. From 2000 onwards, economic freedom is available annually. Thus, period 7
averages economic freedom from 2001 to 2005 and period 8 averages economic freedom from 2006 to 2010. Economic freedom,
lagged one period, is included in all speciﬁcations. Table 1 describes all variables and data sources.3. Main empirical results
3.1. Baseline results
Recall, that we use ﬁve different model estimations. Columns (1) to (5) report the estimates for ordinary least squares (OLS),
instrumental variable (IV), ﬁxed effects (FE), ﬁxed effects with instrumental variable (FE IV), and System GMM (GMM), respec-
tively. Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. We also include democracy and the benchmark control variables. We
use robust standard errors clustered by country.
Our baseline speciﬁcation tests the direct impact of aid on economic freedom. The results are presented in Table 2. We ﬁnd
that the coefﬁcient of aid is not signiﬁcant irrespective of what estimation model is employed. The sign of aid changes depending
on model selection. This provides support that aid does not directly impact economic freedom. This non-result ﬁnding is similar to
previous works where aid does not signiﬁcantly impact economic freedom (see, Knedlik and Kronthaler, 2007; Bearce and Tirone,
2010).
In terms of the controls, democracy has a strong positive impact on economic freedom across all ﬁve models. This suggests
that a more democratic country tends to have higher levels of economic freedom. Most of the other control variables are insig-
niﬁcant with a few exceptions. GDP per capita is negative and signiﬁcant when controlling for country dummies (columns 3
and 4) and population growth and male labor force are both negative and signiﬁcant in the GMM speciﬁcation.
The adjusted R-squareds range from 0.21 (FE IV) to 0.72 (OLS). Hansen J p-values for IV estimations and Sargan test p-values
for System GMM show that the null cannot be rejected and, thus, indicate that the exclusion restrictions for the instruments have
been met. We report the corresponding p-values signifying the validity of the exclusion restrictions in all tables. Additionally, in
the case of System GMM, the p-values testing for second order autocorrelation suggest that our model is not susceptible to second8 The 8 time periods are 1971–1975, 1976–1980, 1981–1985, 1986–1990, 1991–1995, 1996–2000, 2001–2005 and 2006–2010.
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Table 3
Economic freedom, foreign aid and democracy interactions.
Dependent variable is economic freedom (EF). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 0.706*** 0.683*** 0.237*** 0.219** 0.541***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
Aid t − 1 0.009 −0.008 0.013 −0.012 0.0003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt − 1 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.0003)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.09* 0.018 −0.395** −0.641** 0.066***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.19) (0.20) (0.02)
Democt − 1 0.007 0.005 0.024* 0.029** 0.016***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.037 −0.049 −0.014 −0.042 −0.105***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.020 0.008*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.002 −0.003 −0.027** −0.028** −0.017***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Constant 1.719*** 2.324** 9.611*** – 3.989***
(0.56) (0.74) (1.65) (0.41)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 303 294 303 290 304
Adj. R2 0.73 0.71 0.53 0.32 –
Number of countries 81 80 81 76 82
Number of instruments – 12 – 12 69
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.35 – 0.14 0.33
Auto-correlation p-value – – – – 0.12
r ¼ ni – – – – 1.19
Marginal effects
10th percentile of Democ −0.01 −0.03*** −0.001 −0.02** −0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
90th percentile of Democ 0.03*** 0.02 0.03*** 0.002 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Mean of Democ 0.02** −0.002 0.02* −0.008 0.004***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
7N. Dutta, C.R. Williamson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxorder autocorrelation (Roodman, 2009a). We report the number of instruments as well as the ‘r’, the ratio of countries to instru-
ments. The ratio is greater than one indicating that the assumptions for second order autocorrelation and overidentifying restric-
tions tests are not violated. In addition, the ratio also suggests that our estimates are not prone to Type I error, generating
signiﬁcant correlations even if there is no underlying association (Roodman, 2009b; Asiedu and Lien, 2011).
3.2. Main results
From Table 3 onward, we explore our main conjecture exploring aid's impact conditional on political institutions. First, we ex-
plore aid's impact conditional on democracy. Similar to Table (2), we employ all estimation strategies. The results are presented in
Table 3. We ﬁnd the coefﬁcient of the interaction term, Aid ∗ Democ, is positive and signiﬁcant in all ﬁve speciﬁcations.
To calculate economic signiﬁcance, we estimate the marginal impacts reported at the bottom of the table. We estimate δEFitδAidit at
the 10th percentile, 90th percentile and the mean of democracy for our sample of countries. As suspected, aid's impact depends
on the strength of democratic institutions. In autocratic countries at the 10th percentile of polity2 with a score of about −8.2 (for
example, Morocco), the marginal impact of aid is negative in all speciﬁcations and signiﬁcant in the IV, ﬁxed effect IV, and GMM
speciﬁcation. For example, a 10 percentage point increase in aid, almost one standard deviation, can reduce economic freedom by
0.2 or 0.3 units, depending on the speciﬁcation. This is roughly between a 1/5th to 1/4th standard deviation decrease. Although
the size of the effect is relatively small, aid given to countries without democratic checks can potentially decrease economic
freedom.
For countries at the 90th percentile, or a score of 10 (Mauritius in 2000), δEFitδAidit is positive in all ﬁve models and signiﬁcant in
three. Using the GMM speciﬁcation as an example, a 10 percentage point increase in foreign aid enhances economic freedom by
about 0.3 units. This suggests that aid is channeled toward enhancing economic freedom under democratic checks. Countries at
the mean of democracy, a 2.7 polity2 score, have mixed results. The OLS, ﬁxed effects, and GMM speciﬁcations follow a similar
pattern as those at the 90th percentile, but with smaller size coefﬁcients. The marginal effects from the IV estimations are negative
but insigniﬁcant.Please cite this article as: Dutta, N.,Williamson, C.R., Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions, Europe-
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Table 4
Economic Freedom, Foreign Aid and Durable Interactions
Dependent variable is Economic Freedom (EF). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 0.725*** 0.762*** 0.255*** 0.237** 0.567***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
Aidt − 1 0.020** 0.055** 0.018* −0.007 0.009***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.002)
Aidt – 1 ∗ Durablet − 1 −0.001** −0.003** −0.001** −0.0002 −0.001***
(0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.0001)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.073 0.136* −0.333 −0.579** 0.104***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.23) (0.21) (0.02)
Democt − 1 0.014** 0.008 0.030** 0.035** 0.024***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.042 −0.067* −0.016 −0.026 −0.120***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.016 −0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.002 −0.001 −0.022 −0.024* −0.020***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Durablet − 1 0.002 0.008** −0.004 −0.006 −0.009***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
Constant 1.791*** 0.532 8.727*** – 4.049***
(0.59) (0.83) (1.83) (0.404)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 303 294 303 290 304
Adj. R2 0.73 0.69 0.52 0.32 –
Number of countries 81 80 81 76 82
Number of instruments – 12 – 4 70
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.40 – 0.57 0.32
Auto-correlation p-value – – – – 0.15
r ¼ ni – – – – 1.11
Marginal effects
10th percentile of durable 0.02** 0.05** 0.02 −0.01 0.004***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.002)
90th percentile of durable −0.05 −010*** −0.02 −0.02 −0.05***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.004)
Mean of durable −0.01 −0.01 0.001 −0.01 −0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
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for development of a country providing continuity and stability. However, regime entrenchment can also stiﬂe political competi-
tion undermining development and institutional quality (see, Kono and Montinola, 2009). Thus, we check aid's effectiveness with
regard to political durability. To do so, we use the interaction term between aid times durable.
The results are presented in Table 4. For OLS, IV, ﬁxed effects, and System GMM, the sign of the interaction term is negative
and signiﬁcant. This suggests that political durability may follow an entrenchment story where aid possibly decreases the quality
of economic institutions in older regimes.
For the OLS, IV, and GMM speciﬁcations, the marginal effect is positive and signiﬁcant at low levels of durability (the 10th per-
centile or approximately 2 years). This suggests that aid can potentially improve economic freedom in younger regimes; however,
the size of the impact is relatively small. In addition, according to the IV and GMM speciﬁcations, as durability rises, the impact of
aid on economic freedom becomes negative and signiﬁcant. This occurs at the mean level of durability, about 23 years, in the
GMM speciﬁcation, or at 90th percentile, 54 years, in the IV regression. Both ﬁxed effects estimations do not report any signiﬁcant
marginal effects of aid conditional on durability.
Collectively, our results provide some indication that democracy can channel aid into increasing economic freedom, but aid
given to durable political regimes may be used in a manner that decreases economic freedom.4. Robustness analysis
To provide robustness to our analysis, we provide several sensitivity checks to our main ﬁndings. Aid's strongest impact is
from the Aid ∗ democracy interaction speciﬁcations from Table 3. Therefore, we test the robustness of these speciﬁcations in
order to provide the most generous opportunity for the impact of foreign aid. Our robustness checks include additional control
variables, changes in economic freedom, and post-Cold War estimations.Please cite this article as: Dutta, N.,Williamson, C.R., Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions, Europe-
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capita (Kilby, 2005), trade as a share of GDP (Coviello and Islam, 2006; Knedlik and Kronthaler, 2007), and resource rents as a
share of GDP (Knedlik and Kronthaler, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008). Arms imports and natural resource rents are linked to poor
institutional quality while trade is shown to increase institutional quality.
The results, presented in Table 5, are mixed. The OLS, IV and GMM speciﬁcations remain robust to the inclusion of the addi-
tional variables as the interaction term between aid and democracy is positive and signiﬁcant. The interaction term's coefﬁcient
loses signiﬁcance in both ﬁxed effects estimations.
Turning to the marginal effects, the ﬁndings are similar to the results in Table 3 with a few exceptions. As before, the marginal
impact is positive and signiﬁcant at the mean level of democracy in the OLS and ﬁxed effects estimations, losing signiﬁcance in
the GMM regression. At the 90th percentile, the results are robust where the marginal impact is positive and signiﬁcant in the
same three regressions (OLS, ﬁxed effects, and GMM). At the 10th percentile, the marginal impact remains negative and signiﬁ-
cant in the IV estimation and GMM speciﬁcation but loses signiﬁcance in the ﬁxed effects IV regression.
This robustness check provides support that aid can signiﬁcantly increase economic freedom when given to democratic coun-
tries; however, the results also highlight that the ﬁndings are contingent on model speciﬁcation as well as choice of control
variables.Table 5
Economic Freedom, Foreign Aid and Democracy Interactions–Additional Controls.
Dependent variable is Economic Freedom (EF). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, and a indicates signiﬁcance at 11%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 0.667*** 0.638*** 0.178** 0.185** 0.495***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.025)
Aid t − 1 0.009 −0.013 0.024a 0.024 −0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.003)
Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt − 1 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.076 −0.020 −0.009 −0.112 0.086***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.24) (0.34) (0.029)
Democt − 1 0.005 0.007 0.030** 0.030** 0.015**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.007)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.052 −0.064 −0.005 −0.010 −0.085***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.012)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.019 0.007
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.004 −0.006 −0.037** −0.037** −0.015***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.006)
Arms imports pct − 1 0.002* 0.002** 0.0001 −0.00001 0.001
(0.001) (0.00) (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
Resource rentt − 1 −0.005 −0.005 0.003 0.003 0.012***
(0.005) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)
Tradet − 1 0.0004 0.001 −0.006* −0.006** −0.005***
(0.001) (0.00) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant 2.252** 3.177*** 8.235*** – 4.225***
(0.74) (0.91) (2.15) – (0.570)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 258 250 258 245 259
Adj. R2 0.72 0.70 0.42 0.16 –
Number of countries 79 78 79 73 80
Number of instruments – 12 – 12 72
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.28 – 0.27 0.38
Auto-correlation p-value – – – – 0.10
r ¼ ni – – – – 1.11
Marginal effects
10th percentile of Democ −0.01 −0.03*** 0.02 0.01 −0.02***
(0.01)
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.003)
90th percentile of Democ 0.04*** 0.01 0.03** 0.04 0.03***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.007)
Mean of Democ 0.02** −0.01 0.03* 0.03 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.004)
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Table 6
Change in economic freedom, foreign aid and democracy interactions.
Dependent variable isΔeconomic freedom. Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 −0.294*** −0.317*** −0.763*** −0.781*** 0.051***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
Aid t − 1 0.009 −0.008 0.013 −0.012 −0.0001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)
Aid t − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001***
−0.001 (0.00) −0.0004 (0.00) (0.0004)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.090* 0.018 −0.395** −0.641** −0.370***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.19) (0.20) (0.044)
Democt − 1 0.007 0.005 0.024* 0.029** 0.032***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.037 −0.049 −0.014 −0.042 0.017***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.003)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.020 −0.058***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.002 −0.003 −0.027** −0.028** −0.024***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
Constant 1.719** 2.324** 9.611*** – 0.619***
(0.56) (0.74) (1.65) – (0.035)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CountrydDummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 303 294 303 290 299
Adj. R2 0.32 0.28 0.68 0.53 –
Number of countries 81 80 81 76 82
Number of instruments – 12 – 12 66
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.35 – 0.14 0.31
Auto-correlation p-value – – – – 0.33
r ¼ ni – – – – 1.24
Marginal effects
10th percentile of Democ −0.01 −0.03*** −0.001 −0.02** −0.02***
0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
90th percentile of Democ 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.001 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Mean of Democ 0.02** −0.002 0.02* −0.01 0.004***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
10 N. Dutta, C.R. Williamson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxNext, we examine how aid's impact conditional on democratic checks inﬂuences changes in economic freedom. We replace
current levels of economic freedom as the dependent variable with changes in economic freedom. The results are presented in
Table 6. In all speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient of the interaction term, Aidt-1 ∗ Democt-1, is positive and signiﬁcant—the same ﬁnding
as in Table 3. The marginal impacts are a lso similar to those from Table 3, in terms of both size and signiﬁcance. For example,
according to the GMM speciﬁcation, a 10 percentage point increase in foreign aid to autocratic countries leads to a decrease in
economic freedom by about 0.2 units. The same increase in aid to highly democratic countries increases economic freedom by
0.3 units.
Dunning (2004) and Bearce and Tirone (2010) point out that foreign aid can be more effective in the post-Cold War period.
Thus, as our last robustness check, we test aid's impact conditional on democracy after the Cold War. We re-estimate Table 3 from
1990 to 2010 and present the results in Table 7. The coefﬁcient of the interaction term is positive and insigniﬁcant except in the
IV regression where it is signiﬁcant but negative.
Examining the marginal effects suggest that in most speciﬁcations aid's marginal impact conditional on democracy is insignif-
icant. Supporting our previous ﬁndings, the marginal effect is positive and signiﬁcant at the mean level and 90th percentile of de-
mocracy in the OLS regression. Contrary to Table 3's results, in the IV estimation the marginal effect is positive and signiﬁcant at
the mean level as well as at the 10th percentile of democracy. This ﬁnding indicates that in the post-Cold War period aid given to
autocratic countries and countries at low levels of democracies can improve economic freedom scores. For example, a 10 percent-
age point increase in aid can increase economic freedom by 0.5 units, approximately a 1/2 standard deviation increase. This is a
larger impact than previously found in countries at the highest level of democracy (see Table 3).
Collectively, our robustness tests do not provide overwhelming evidence that aid, unconditional or conditional on democracy,
can increase economic freedom. Our strongest support comes from our initial examination in Table 3. However, adding additional
controls or splitting the time period, creates mixed results. Given the lack of consistency across model speciﬁcations andPlease cite this article as: Dutta, N.,Williamson, C.R., Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions, Europe-
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Table 7
Economic freedom, foreign aid and democracy interactions–post cold war.
Dependent variable is economic freedom (EF). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthe-
ses. Post-Cold War period includes 1991–2010, ﬁve year averages, creating 4 periods. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 0.808*** 0.950*** 0.170** 0.350*** 0.586***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.120)
Aid t − 1 0.017** 0.030** 0.001 0.005 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.008)
Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 0.0002 −0.003* 0.001 −0.0002 −0.001
(0.006) (0.00) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.057 0.009 −0.068 −0.026 0.032
(0.04) (0.04) (0.33) (0.28) (0.094)
Democt − 1 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.024 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.023)
Pop. Growtht – 1 −0.002 −0.032 0.026 −0.014 0.033
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.033)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.010 0.002 0.012 −0.014 −0.005
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.014)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.001 −0.007* −0.002 0.016 −0.009
(0.004) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.009)
Constant 1.073** 0.954* 5.812** – 3.291**
(0.54) (0.50) (2.39) – (1.300)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 230 151 230 146 231
Adj. R2 0.80 0.87 0.34 −0.01 –
Number of countries 81 78 81 73 82
Number of instruments – 12 – 12 23
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.86 – 0.29 0.57
Auto-correlation p-value – – – –
r ¼ ni – – – – 3.56
Marginal effects
10th percentile of Democ 0.01 0.05** −0.01 −0.004 0.008
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.013)
90th percentile of Democ 0.02** 0.003 0.01 0.01 −0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017)
Mean of Democ 0.02*** 0.02** 0.004 0.01 0.0001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008)
11N. Dutta, C.R. Williamson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxsensitivity checks, our results do not provide strong evidence that aid can enhance economic freedom. In addition, we also ﬁnd
that in autocratic countries aid may decrease economic freedom.
Since our results are inconclusive, we provide two more tests presented in Appendices A2 and A3. In Appendix A2, we replace
the overall economic freedom index as the dependent variable with the economic freedom sub-indices: size of government, qual-
ity of the legal system, sound money, freedom to trade, and extent of regulations. We continue to use the aid, democracy inter-
action speciﬁcation in Table 3 as the benchmark, but we only show the GMM results to save space. We do so as to not over bias
the results since our set of political based instruments may underestimate the impact of aid, and the GMM ﬁndings provide the
strongest support in favor of aid.
As shown, in general, the ﬁndings support the results presented in Table 3, column 5 where aid conditional on democracy in-
creases economic freedom. The marginal effects suggest that aid given to mean level democratic countries can signiﬁcantly in-
crease soundness of money but also increase the size of government and number of regulations. Aid given to countries at the
90th percentile of democracy may signiﬁcantly increase legal quality, soundness of money, and reduce regulations, but increase
the size of government. In autocratic countries at the 10th percentile of democracy, aid signiﬁcantly increases the size of govern-
ment, trade barriers, and regulations, and it may signiﬁcantly reduce legal quality and soundness of money. One interesting result,
according to the marginal effects for column 1, is that aid signiﬁcantly increases the size of government regardless of the quality of
political institutions.
In Appendix A3, we replace our main explanatory variable, aid as a share of GNI, with net ofﬁcial development assistance per
capita (Aid pc), lagged one period. We retest aid per capita conditional on democracy using all ﬁve model speciﬁcations. The co-
efﬁcient on the interaction term across all speciﬁcations is insigniﬁcant.
According to the marginal effects, aid may signiﬁcantly increase economic freedom in a country at the mean level of democ-
racy but only according to the OLS and GMM speciﬁcations. In addition, aid may increase economic freedom in a country at the
90th percentile according to the OLS, IV, and GMM speciﬁcations. Lastly, the GMM results suggest that aid can increase economicPlease cite this article as: Dutta, N.,Williamson, C.R., Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions, Europe-
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12 N. Dutta, C.R. Williamson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxfreedom in autocratic countries. Thus, the GMM ﬁndings suggest that aid per capita can increase economic freedom at any level of
autocracy or democracy. The remaining marginal effects are insigniﬁcant.
If we exclude the GMM ﬁndings, these results diminish conﬁdence that aid can enhance economic freedom. However, the
GMM results provide the strongest support for aid increasing economic freedom.5. Conclusion
If economically free institutions are necessary for human well-being, understanding what factors can contribute to institutional
change is critical. In this paper, we seek to understand if foreign aid can be used as a policy instrument to facilitate economic re-
form. We ﬁnd some evidence that aid's impact on economic freedom depends on the recipient nations' quality of political insti-
tutions. For democratic countries, aid may improve economic freedom; however, aid given to entrenched regimes may degrade
economic institutions.
The results are highly sensitive to model selection, identiﬁcation strategies, choice of controls, time period sample, and mea-
surement of aid. The GMM results provide the best case scenario for foreign aid's potential positive impact on economic freedom.
However, when using IV estimations, most of our results suggest that aid does not have a positive upside.
Collectively, our results cast doubt on using aid to change economic policies and institutions supporting the frustrations after
the Washington Consensus. As a result, donors should be cautious when attempting to use aid to inﬂuence economic institutions.
In addition, most countries that ‘need’ aid do not have high quality, democratic institutions. Overall, this highlights the sensitive
nature of ﬁnding a top-down, one size ﬁts all solution to institutional improvements.Acknowledgements
We thank two anonymous reviewers, the special issue editors, the participants at the 2015 Public Choice Society Meeting, and
Daniel Bennett for helpful comments and suggestions.Appendix A
Appendix A1
IV ﬁrst stage results.
First stage results from Table 2 regressions 2 and 4, where Aidt − 1 is instrumented with UN votes with USt − 1, Francet − 1, Great Britaint − 1, Italyt − 1, and Japant − 1;
and UNSCt − 2. First stage results from Table 3 regressions 2 and 4, where Aidt − 1 is instrumented with UN votes with USt − 1, Francet − 1, Great Britaint − 1, Italyt − 1,
and Japant − 1; and UNSCt − 2. Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt − 1 is instrumentedwith UNvotes USt – 1 ∗ Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt − 1, UN votes Francet – 1 ∗ Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt − 1, UN votes
GBt – 1 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt – 1, UN votes Italyt – 1 ∗ Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt – 1, UN votes Japant – 1 ∗ Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt – 1; and UNSCt – 2 ∗ Aidt – 1 ∗ Democt – 1. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 2 Table 3
(2) (4) (2) (2) (4) (4)
Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1*Democt − 1 Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1*Democt − 1
IV FE IV IV IV FE IV FE IV
UN votes with USt − 1 14.405 16.992 1.254 25.727* 9.526 2.449
(11.26) (14.29) (13.18) (14.65) (16.53) (35.13)
UN votes with Francet − 1 −15.749 4.208 16.668 −4.092 26.748 −12.366
(37.59) (29.59) (43.79) (43.94) (35.19) (46.75)
UN votes with GBt − 1 −0.830 29.659 −11.360 −150.131 25.769 −138.819
(68.68) (59.74) (66.41) (102.29) (51.43) (119.01)
UN votes with Italyt − 1 43.652 −38.508 9.001 98.696 −59.313* 181.361
(46.65) (45.75) (37.00) (84.75) (34.71) (120.33)
UN votes with Japant− 1 −37.008** 15.864 −23.074 17.908 19.109 −67.961*
(16.11) (23.72) (18.26) (31.64) (24.91) (37.91)
UNSCt − 2 −4.999* −2.716 −2.955 −1.605 −2.629 −0.922
(2.72) (2.82) (2.15) (3.79) (2.50) (3.59)
UN votes USt − 1 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 0.196 −0.005 0.336 −0.154
(0.42) (0.60) (0.23) (0.50)
UN votes Francet − 1 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 −4.239** 7.260* −2.257** 5.093**
(1.73) (3.68) (0.91) (2.33)
UN votes GBt − 1 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 2.362** −5.552*** −0.230 −4.268***
(1.11) (0.91) (0.60) (0.88)
UN votes Italyt − 1 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 3.000** −0.010 3.126** −0.296
(1.50) (3.22) (0.92) (3.11)
UN votes Japant − 1 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 −1.232* 0.312 −1.089* 1.516
(0.71) (0.99) (0.63) (1.33)
UNSCt − 2 ∗ Aidt − 1 ∗ Democt − 1 0.162 0.176 0.022 0.172
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Appendix A1 (continued)
Table 2 Table 3
(2) (4) (2) (2) (4) (4)
Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1*Democt − 1 Aidt − 1 Aidt − 1*Democt − 1
IV FE IV IV IV FE IV FE IV
(0.10) (0.17) (0.09) (0.15)
EFt − 1 −1.115 −1.375* −0.901 0.169 −1.617** 1.497
(1.31) (0.76) (0.94) (0.45) (0.72) (1.03)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 −4.134*** −5.946* −3.017*** 0.870 −5.116* 2.644
(0.65) (3.28) (0.65) (0.55) (2.72) (3.94)
Democt − 1 −0.069 0.013 −0.059 0.212 0.168 −0.056
(0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.34)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.410 −0.804 −0.251 0.916 −0.741 0.096
(0.63) (0.49) (0.54) (0.62) (0.46) (0.78)
GDP Growtht − 1 −0.079 0.197 −0.066 −0.477 0.205 −0.356
(0.23) (0.15) (0.21) (0.29) (0.13) (0.30)
LFPR (male)t − 1 −0.032 −0.119 −0.037 −0.088 −0.074 0.029
(0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.21)
Constant 49.429*** 64.638** 41.072*** 1.188 56.959** −25.399
(12.04) (23.15) (8.67) (10.67) (20.68) (30.05)
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
Adj. R2 0.42 0.22 0.55 0.98 0.29 0.99
F-statistic 12.40 5.00 19.09 670.33 9.04 1272
Appendix A2
Economic freedom sub-indices, foreign aid and democracy interactions.
Dependent variables include 1) size of government (Size gov), 2) legal structure and security of property rights (Legal), 3)monetary policy and price stability (Money),
4) freedom to trade without regulations (Trade), and 5) regulation of credit, labor and business (Regulation). All indices range from 0 to 10 with higher numbers
representing greater economic freedom and collected from Gwartney et al. (2015). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered
by country are reported in parentheses. All speciﬁcations are System GMM. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size gov Legal Money Trade Regulation
EFt − 1 0.552*** 0.460*** 0.489*** 0.391*** 0.434***
(0.035) (0.025) (0.015) (0.012) (0.031)
Aidt − 1 −0.033*** −0.001 0.018*** −0.007** −0.010***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Aidt − 1*Democt − 1 −0.001*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.001** 0.003***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 −0.289*** 0.312*** 0.258*** 0.095*** −0.127***
(0.053) (0.070) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037)
Democt − 1 0.046*** −0.033*** 0.011** 0.0316*** −0.018***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Pop. Growtht − 1 0.017 0.046*** −0.358*** −0.002 −0.073***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.012)
GDP Growtht − 1 −0.053*** −0.019** 0.021** 0.034*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
LFPR (male)t 1 0.001 −0.112*** −0.041*** 0.024*** −0.031***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 5.393*** 9.746*** 5.543*** 1.204*** 7.461***
(0.825) (1.001) (0.983) (0.326) (0.639)
Observations 305 297 305 275 304
Number of countries 82 82 82 75 82
Number of instruments 69 69 69 69 69
Hansen J/Sargan p-value 0.28 0.19 0.52 0.44 0.77
Autocorrelation p-value 0.41 0.30 0.97 0.42 0.89
r ¼ ni 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
Marginal effects
10th percentile of Democ −0.02*** −0.03*** −0.003*** −0.01*** −0.02***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.04) (0.003)
90th percentile of Democ −0.05*** 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.004 0.02***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Mean of Democ −0.03*** 0.004 0.03*** −0.004 −0.005**
(0.05) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
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Appendix A3
Economic freedom, foreign aid per capita and democracy interactions.
Dependent variable is economic freedom (EF). Period dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV FE FE IV GMM
EFt − 1 0.695*** 0.703*** 0.218** 0.226*** 0.535***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.022)
Aid pc t − 1 0.002* 0.054 0.001 0.001 0.004***
(0.001) (0.04) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0003)
Aid pc t − 1*Democt − 1 0.00002 −0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00005)
GDP per cap.(log)t − 1 0.050 0.0002 −0.536** −0.700*** 0.151***
(0.04) (0.0002) (0.20) (0.17) (0.033)
Democt − 1 0.018** 0.011 0.037** 0.037*** 0.050***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
Pop. Growtht − 1 −0.028 −0.024 −0.0003 −0.009 −0.049***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.008)
GDP Growtht − 1 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.018 −0.0006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
LFPR (male)t − 1 0.0004 −0.001 −0.023 −0.023* −0.030***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
Constant 1.799*** 1.904*** 10.351*** – 4.179***
(0.43) (0.51) (1.77) (0.339)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No
Observations 307 298 307 295 308
Adj. R2 0.72 0.71 0.50 0.32 –
Number of countries 82 81 82 78 83
Number of instruments – 12 – 12 69
Hansen J/Sargan p-value – 0.20 – 0.22 0.33
Auto-correlation p-value – – – – 0.22
r ¼ ni – – – – 1.20
Marginal effects
10th percentile of Democ 0.001 −0.002 0.001 −0.0001 0.005***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0003)
90th percentile of Democ 0.002** 0.001* 0.002 0.001 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0005)
Mean of Democ 0.002** −0.0001 0.002 0.001 0.004***
(0.001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0002)
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